

SANITIZED VERSION

NUK-76-334

DRAFT

NOTICE

21-30-10-27

This supplement up-dates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis is on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba.

DEFINITIONS

An Emergency Operational Capability exists when a site could launch some missiles should a decision be made to do so.

A Full Operational Capability is achieved when a site has reached a steady state of readiness with the ability to salvo its first missile load within about 6 to 8 hours and with the ability to refire within 4 to 6 hours.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The comparative photographic coverage indicates that, while an emergency operational capability could exist at several offensive missile sites, the Soviet objective in Cuba is to attain full operational capability at all sites as soon as possible, rather than to prepare each site for an emergency launch capability as soon as the missiles and equipment arrive in the area. (See Figure 1).

2. There are clear indications that at least five Soviet offensive missile regiments, each with eight launchers and at least sixteen missiles, will become operation in Cuba. (See Table 1) This will represent a first salvo potential of 40 missiles with a refire capability of an additional 40 missiles. It should be noted that this threat against the U.S. is approximately one-half the currently estimated ICBM missile threat from the USSR.

OFFENSIVE MISSILE READINESS

General

5. An emergency operational capability could be achieved at an MRBM site as soon as the launch crews, missiles, launchers, propellants, warheads and necessary checkout equipment have arrived at a presurveyed area. Full operational capability would be achieved when the erector/launchers are in place, the cabling between launchers and control is installed, and the launch crews, missiles, propellant trucks, warheads and checkout equipment are arranged at the site in an orderly manner. At an MRBM site, full operational readiness would probably lag the emergency operational capability by about four days.

6. An emergency operational capability could be achieved at an IRBM site as soon as the concrete pads and launcher are installed, the missile and its warhead and propellants are present, and sufficient associated equipment is available to checkout the missile system. Full operational readiness would be achieved when all pads with launchers are completed and checked out, the missiles and their nosecones are available and completely checked but not necessarily mated, and the propellants and propellant loading systems are in place and checked out. At an IRBM site, full operational readiness would probably lag the emergency operational capability by about two weeks.

3. Site 1 This site contains four launchers which have been placed in their operational positions. Fourteen oxidizer and 8 fuel vehicles have been identified. Six missile-ready buildings have been erected. At least seven missile transporters are present. The latest coverage available (Mission 3113 on 19 October), tends to confirm that it has full operational capability.

4. Site 2 There are 6 missile transporters and 3 launchers visible in this site on Mission 3113 (19 October). The launchers have not been placed in operational positions but preparation of these positions has been started. There are two missile-ready buildings. Nine oxidizer and 5 fuel trucks have been identified. Improvements noted on 19 October coverage causes us to revise the estimated date of full operational capability to 22 October. An emergency capability was probably reached on 17 October.

5. Site 3 There are two possible missile transporters and two erectors at this site. The erectors appear to be in their operational position. There are two confirmed and two possible ready buildings. Latest photography reveals continued construction on the arched-roof building. Nineteen permanent buildings, one of which is still under construction, were observed on photography of 19 October. There are approximately 46 miscellaneous vehicles in the immediate area of the site. No security fencing is evident in photography. We estimate that this site had an emergency operational capability on 20 October and that it will reach full operational readiness on 25 October.

6. Site 4 In photograph of 19 October, seven canvas-covered missile transporters were observed at this site. In addition, there are two, and possibly four, erectors, none of

missile launch vehicles and 16 trucks have been noted. No arched-roof buildings or permanent buildings are identifiable in the photography. We estimate this site will have an emergency operational capability on 25 October and will reach full operational readiness on 28 October.

Sagua La Grande Area

9. Site 1 There are six missile transporters and four launcher-erectors, three of which are in position. Only eight tank trucks have been identified; however, there are over 100 other vehicles in the area. Three missile shelters have been erected and an arched-roof building, possibly for nuclear storage, is under construction. Further evaluation of the progress in bringing the observed equipment to full operational status as correlated with results achieved in other sites indicates this site should achieve a full operational capability by 22 October.

10. Site 2 There are four missile transporters and four launcher-erectors, three of which are in position. Two groups of propellant tankers, sufficient to service the battalion, have been identified. Four missile shelters have been erected and three more are possibly being erected. One possible arched-roof building is observed. Further evaluation of the available equipment and the progress achieved at other MFBM sites indicates this site probably achieved a full operational capability by 20 October.

Guillory Area

11. Site 1 This site consists of four launch pads in a late stage of construction. Photography of 19 October indicates that concrete launching pads are being constructed. The equipment cabling and control bunker appear complete. Propellant tanks, and one ready building are under construction. No missile equipment is at the site. A probable warhead storage building is nearing completion. We estimate an emergency operational capability by 15 November and full operational readiness by 1 December.

12. Site 2 This site is in an earlier stage of construction than Site 1. The launch pad area, cabling and the control bunker are under construction. No construction activity for propellant tanks, missile-ready buildings and warhead storage buildings have been noted. No missile equipment is at the site. We estimate an emergency operational capability by 1 December and full operational readiness by 15 December.

Remedios Area

13. Site 1 This site identified in photography of 18 October 1962 is in an early stage of construction. The initial excavations in the launch pad area have been completed and clearing for cabling and the control bunker has been completed. Footings for the other control bunker have been completed. A concrete batch plant has been established at the site. A probable nuclear warhead storage building is under construction. No missile equipment has been identified in the area. This

Chernay Site 2. We estimate an emergency operational capability by 1 December and full operational readiness by 15 December.

14. Although a second site of four launch pads has not been detected, such a site is probably scheduled or is in a very early phase of construction.

REEM Field Site Characteristics (Figure 12)

15. An REEM battalion has the capability of conducting launch operations from unimproved launch areas; however, in order to achieve a better readiness and maintenance capability certain improvements are necessary. These include missile-ready shelters, launch pad leveling, and stabilization and revetments. Preliminary analysis indicates that the missile erection is accomplished by use of the missile transporter in conjunction with the launcher-erector, probably using an "A" frame technique of erection. Each missile is serviced by two oxidizer trucks and one fuel truck. A small revetted area, located about sixty feet away contains a possible checkout panel and/or power supply. The identification and location of complete missile checkout equipment has not been determined. Likewise, warhead storage and handling equipment has not been identified, although a concrete arched-roof building is a possible storage site. After firing, a second missile, with its associated fuel and oxidizer trucks, is brought to the site and the operation is repeated.

IRBM Site Characteristics (Figure 13)

16. Analysis of IRBM sites in three different stages of construction, provides a basis for determining the completed site characteristics. A centrally located launch control bunker serves two launch pads. Garages for a vehicle revetment to the launcher are below ground level in a pre-formed concrete conduit which is large enough to allow launch crew access. This design facilitates refire capability. The entire site is permanent in nature.

Command and Control

17. The communications links proving command/operational data to the Soviet Rocket Forces deployed in Cuba still have not been identified. Heavy volume, military-type communications passing between the USSR and Cuba on existing links have not been detected nor have any new links been detected.

Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

20. Construction is continuing at the probable nuclear storage site at Cuernavaca IRM Site V, with further additions being made to the earth cover of the drive-through building (114 by 60 feet). A similar smaller building (70 by 40 feet) located at the Remerito IRM site is possibly for nuclear storage. Earthmoving of this building has just started.

21. The possible nuclear storage building (70 by 55 feet) under construction at the Sagua La Grande MRBM Site 1 has advanced from 20 percent roof cover on 17 October to complete roof cover on 19 October. Similar buildings in early stages of construction at San Cristobal MRBM Sites 1 and 3 show little change from 17 October to 18 October. No additional suspected storage sites have been detected.

22. We still lack positive evidence that nuclear weapons are now deployed in Cuba, but we may be unable to detect the presence of such weapons in temporary storage facilities.

Offensive Force Levels

See Table 1

Support and Supply

No change.

Coastal Defense Missiles

No change.

Air Defense Missiles

23. Of the 24 primary surface-to-air missile sites (SA-2), 22 are now individually operational. An additional surface-to-air missile assembly area has been identified at Marianillo, bringing the total to 7. See Table 2 for a list of surface-to-air missile sites, missile assembly areas, and associated equipment.

24. Photography confirms the presence of a modified three-dish Fruitset (E-Band) radar at the Senadu SAM site. No additional intercept of C-Band Fruitset signals has been reported.

Guided Missile Patrol Craft

No change.

Tactical Missiles

No change.

Table 1

SUMMARY OF MRBM AND IRBM THREAT IN CUBA

Status as of 2300 Hours on 21 October 1962
 (Updates Table 2 in SC-09538-62/KH)

<u>Locations</u>	<u>Sites</u>		<u>Launchers</u>		<u>Missiles</u>		<u>Facilities</u>
	<u>Identified</u>	<u>Probably Planned</u>	<u>Identified</u>	<u>Probable Deployed</u>	<u>Identified</u>	<u>Probable Basic Load</u>	<u>Nuclear Warheads</u>
<u>MRBM - Range 1020-nm NRE***</u>							
San Cristobal (2 regiments)	4	4	11 (poss 14)	16	20 (poss 22)	32	probable (u/c)
Sagua La Grande (1 regiment)	2	2	8	8	10	16	possible (u/c)
MRBM TOTAL	6	6	19 (poss 22)	24	30 (poss 32)	48	
<u>IRBM - Range 2200-nm NRE***</u>							
Guanajay (1 regiment)	2	2	8(u/c)****	8	0	16	probable(u/c)
Remedios (1 regiment)	1	2	4(u/c)	8	0	16	possible(u/c)
IRBM TOTAL	3	4	12(u/c)	16	0	32	
GRAND TOTAL	9	10	31 (poss 34)	40	30 (poss 32)	80	

* This reflects an estimate of 8 operational launchers authorized per regiment.

** This reflects an estimate of 16 operational missiles per regiment.

*** NRE - Non-Rotating Earth Range.

**** (u/c) - Under Construction.